Abstract. Pseudorandom functions are traditionally built upon block ciphers, but with the trend of permutation based cryptography, it is a natural question to investigate the design of pseudorandom functions from random permutations. We present a generic study of how to build beyond birthday bound secure pseudorandom functions from public random permutations. We first show that a pseudorandom function based on a single permutation call cannot be secure beyond the 2 n/2 birthday bound, where n is the state size of the function. We next consider the Sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction, that instantiates the sum of permutations with the Even-Mansour construction. We prove that SoEM achieves tight 2n/3-bit security if it is constructed from two independent permutations and two randomly drawn keys. We also demonstrate a birthday bound attack if either the permutations or the keys are identical. Finally, we present the Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers (SoKAC) construction, a translation of Encrypted Davies-Meyer Dual to a public permutation based setting, and show that SoKAC achieves tight 2n/3-bit security even when a single key is used.
Introduction
In the seminal work of Luby and Rackoff [47] , a paradigm of constructing a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) from a pseudorandom function (PRF) was introduced. Their work, motivated by the DES block cipher, consists of an rround Feistel construction involving independent invocations of a PRF. Soon people realized that they actually needed the opposite construction, i.e., constructing a PRF from a PRP. The reason for this is two-fold: (i) PRPs are easier to design than PRFs and (ii) many cryptographic schemes, such as counter mode, are better off if instantiated with a PRF.
The classical PRP-PRF switch [6, 8, 19, 38, 41] , which consists of taking an n-bit block cipher E K as a PRF, is only secure up to the birthday bound: an attacker that can learn around 2 n/2 evaluations of E K can distinguish it from random. Although this bound is acceptable for large enough n, in light of the rise of lightweight block ciphers [3, 4, 16, 18, 30, 36, 40, 46, 62, 67] this bound is on the edge for certain applications. For example, for a 64-bit block cipher, breaking security requires approximately 2 32 · 64 bits of data, which is approximately 35GB. Of a similar kind, Bhargavan and Leurent [13] performed practical attacks on TLS and OpenVPN when a 64-bit block cipher is used.
Various approaches of turning a PRP into a PRF with beyond birthday bound security have been introduced. Hall et al. [38] suggested truncation: trunc m (E K (M )), an approach that was later proven to be secure up to around 2 n−m/2 queries [5, 35] . Bellare et al. [7] proposed the sum of permutations (SoP),
a construction that is known to achieve q/2 n security [5, 28, 48, 57] . Cogliati and Seurin [24] introduced the Encrypted Davies-Meyer (EDM) construction, E K2 (E K1 (M ) ⊕ M ), and proved that it is 2 2n/3 secure. Mennink and Neves [50] improved the security to be 2 n using Patarin's mirror theory [53, 55, 57, 58] . They also introduced the dual: E K2 (E K1 (M )) ⊕ E K1 (M ), called Encrypted DaviesMayer Dual (EDMD), and showed that its security is implied by that of the sum of permutations.
All constructions, however, are yet based on block ciphers. Even stronger, they only evaluate E K in the forward direction. As block ciphers are designed to be efficient in both the forward and inverse direction, these are thus overengineered primitives for this purpose. This is in contrast with the modern trend in cryptography, namely that of permutation based cryptography, where the underlying permutations are particularly developed to be fast in the forward direction, but not necessarily in the inverse direction. Examples of cryptographic permutations include Keccak [12] , Gimli [9] , and SPONGENT [15] .
So what we really need is a PRF designed from public permutations, but the state of the art in this direction is scarce. To our knowledge, the only notable approach in this direction are the keyed sponge [1, 11, 52] and Farfalle [10] , however these constructions have been developed with different incentives in mind. Most importantly, they are variable-length, and for small fixed length messages better solutions may be possible.
Acknowledgedly, the state size of a permutation is typically larger than the block size n of a message: whereas AES has a block size of 128 bits, making the naive birthday bound PRP-PRF switch on the edge, the SHA-3 permutation is of size 1600 bits, and a simple Even-Mansour [32] construction on top of it would give a PRP that behaves like a PRF up to an attack complexity of 2 800 . However, this example permutation is on the extreme end: lightweight permutations such as SPONGENT [15] and PHOTON [37] go as low as 88 and 100 bits, respectively. For these types of permutations, birthday bound solutions are inadequate.
Towards Birthday Bound Security
Suppose we take the sum of permutations (1) , and want to turn it into a PRF conversion function for a public random permutation. Recall that the sum of permutations is secure up to complexity 2 n as long as the underlying block ciphers are secure. A naive way of proceeding is to plug the Even-Mansour block cipher construction
where π is an n-bit permutation, into the sum of permutations. However, the Even-Mansour construction is known to be tightly 2 n/2 birthday bound secure. A simple modular reasoning, in turn, leaves us with an unsatisfiable birthday bound security level.
One way to resolve this is by eschewing the Even-Mansour construction in favor of multiple-round Even-Mansour. For example, 2-round Even-Mansour is secure up to complexity around 2 2n/3 , and the generic composition of the sum of permutation with this construction guarantees security up to the same level as well. On the other hand, the scheme has become twice as expensive in the number of primitive evaluations: it is based on four permutation calls. Fortunately, the poor bound of the composition of the sum of permutations with Even-Mansour is not inherent to the scheme, but rather, it is due to a lossy composition. A dedicated analysis can render an improved bound.
Our Contribution
We tackle the problem of designing a PRF from a public random permutation from a generalized perspective. First, we consider the general design of a PRF based on one and only one public permutation that is preceded and followed by linear mappings, and demonstrate that such construction cannot be secure beyond the birthday bound. The proof consists of considering different types of linear mappings, and deriving attacks in the birthday bound (or faster) for all variants. The result is given in Section 3.
Our second and main contribution centers around the sum of permutations instantiated with Even-Mansour, a construction which we dub SoEM: (Sum of Even Mansour). It is based on two permutations π 1 , π 2 , and it either takes two keys K 1 , K 2 (one before and after each permutation) or it takes a single key K (added before each permutation, and to the final sum). We derive the following results in Section 4:
(i) If π 1 = π 2 , so if both Even-Mansour constructions are instantiated using the same permutation, SoEM can be broken in complexity around 2 n/2 ; (ii) If π 1 and π 2 are independent, and the construction takes a single key K, SoEM can again be broken in complexity around 2 n/2 ; (iii) If π 1 and π 2 are independent, and so are K 1 and K 2 , the resulting construction is tightly secure up to complexity 2 2n/3 .
The proof of (iii) is performed in the ideal permutation model, using Patarin's H-coefficient technique [21, 54, 56] . It resembles ideas of the first iteration in Patarin's mirror theory [57] , but difficulties appear in the fact that the permutations π 1 , π 2 can be queried by the distinguisher. The result sparks curiosity on whether 2n/3-security is also achievable by a construction based on a single key. We answer this question positively by introducing SoKAC (Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers) in Section 5. SoKAC reminds of EDMD instantiated with Even-Mansour, barring subtle differences, but it can likewise be seen as adding a 1-round Key Alternating Cipher (KAC) [17] to a 2-round one. By putting the first permutation equal in both KACs, the construction makes in total two permutation calls per evaluation. Whereas the scheme is only birthday bound secure if the permutations are identical, i.e. if π 1 = π 2 , for the case of independent permutations the construction achieves 2n/3-security even though it only relies on a single n-bit key. The proof is based on the sum-capture lemma [2, 20, 25, 51, 63 ].
Our Contribution in Bigger Perspective
Conversion from public or secret permutations to public or secret functions and vice versa is a fundamental problem in symmetric key cryptography, and our work fills the last remaining notable gap in the picture.
We already discussed the issue of PRF-to-PRP conversion: Luby and Rackoff [47] described the Feistel network, a method still used to design block ciphers. Reversely, PRP-to-PRF conversion was covered by SoP [7] , EDM [24] , and EDMD [50] .
One can consider similar techniques for conversion between public random permutations (RPs) and public random functions (RFs). In this setting, the functions are keyless, and one assumes ideality of the underlying primitives in order to prove security in the indifferentiability framework [49] . The Feistel construction has seen notable indifferentiability analysis [26, 27, 29] , and so has the sum of permutation construction [14, 23, 51] .
Note that there is little incentive to investigate conversion from PRP/PRF to RP/RF. The Even-Mansour construction [32] transforms an RP to a PRP; it has been generalized in [17, 21, 31, 39, 44, 64] . Gentry and Ramzan [34] proposed the idea of combining the Feistel construction and the Even-Mansour cipher, which was later named the Key Alternating Feistel (KAF) cipher by Lampe and Seurin [45] . In the work of Gazi and Tessaro [33] , a construction that turns RFs into PRF has been introduced. Moreover, the Whitened Swap-or-Not construction by Tessaro [65] provides another way of building nearly optimal n-bits secure PRP from RPs or RFs.
This leaves the problem of RP-to-PRF conversion, i.e. the problem considered in this work. The full picture of example conversion techniques is given in Figure 1 .
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Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, we denote by {0, 1} n the set of bit strings of length n. For two bit strings X, Y ∈ {0, 1} n , we denote their bitwise addition as X ⊕ Y . For a value Z, we denote by A ← Z the assignment of Z to the variable A. For a finite set S, we denote by S $ ← − S the uniformly random selection of S from S. We denote by Func(n) the set of all functions on {0, 1} n and by Perm(n) the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n . We denote by t n the encoding of a value t ∈ {0, . . . , 2 n − 1} as an n-bit string. For k, n, r ∈ N, let F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a function that is based on r n-bit permutations π 1 , . . . , π r . We will consider pseudorandom function security of F , where we assume that π 1 , . . . , π r $ ← − Perm(n), and where the distinguisher D is given access to either (F π1,...,πr K , π
where the superscript ± for the π i 's indicates that the distinguisher has bi-directional access. Its goal is to determine which oracle it is given access to:
for
, and ϕ $ ← − Func(n). In the remainder of this work, we will focus on keys of size n or 2n bits.
Pseudorandom Functions With One Permutation Call
We will show that any pseudorandom function F that makes only one permutation call and has linear pre-and post-processing functions cannot achieve security beyond the birthday bound. Let n ∈ N, and let π ∈ Perm(n). Let
n be any two linear mappings (that only consist of modular addition and scalar multiplication). Let
n be the function of Figure 2 . We will show that for independent K 1 , K 2 , there exists a distinguisher that can distinguish any such function from random using at most 3 · 2 n/2 construction queries and at most 3 · 2 n/2 primitive queries. Note that modular addition of the input M to the output C does not influence the security of F 1, as the distinguisher knows the exact value of M . Proposition 1. Let n ∈ N, and consider the function
There exists a distinguisher D making at most 3 · 2 n/2 construction queries and at most 3 · 2 n/2 primitive queries such that
Proof. As the mixing functions L 1 , L 2 are linear, we can represent these as
where
Subcase l 12 = 0 ∨ l 23 = 0. In this case, the input to or the output of the permutation π is not related to M or C. When l 12 = 0, the distinguisher selects arbitrary M, M to obtain C, C . If the event C = C happens, then output 1; otherwise, output 0. This gives a distinguisher in two construction queries with a success probability of 1 − 1/2 n . Similar for l 23 = 0.
Subcase l 11 = 0 ∨ l 21 = 0. In this case, the input to or the output of the permutation π is independent of the keys. When l 11 = 0, the distinguisher selects arbitrary x, x to obtain y, y . Then, it puts M = l x to obtain C and C . If the event A happens, then output 1; otherwise, output 0:
This gives a distinguisher in two construction and two primitive queries with a success probability of 1 − 1/2 n . Similar for l 21 = 0.
Subcase l 22 = 0. In this case, the construction is a generalization of the EvenMansour cipher. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (F 1 π , π) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, π) with significant probability. D makes 2 n/2 construction queries and no primitive queries and operates as follows.
for all query indicesj =j , then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
In the real world, F 1 behaves as a PRP, and thus Pr D ϕ,π
where q = 2 n/2 .
Subcase l 11 , l 12 , l 21 , l 22 , l 23 = 0. This is the most general subcase. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (F 1 π , π) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, π) with significant probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 3 · 2 n/2 construction queries, and 3 · 2 n/2 primitive queries to π in total and operates as follows.
and (x * * (i) , y * * (i) ) as the tuples that satisfy x
, then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
In the real world, there is exactly one (j,ī) such that l
In addition, also l
The equations imply that
and thus that Pr D
For the ideal world, we have
where q = p = 2 n/2 .
Sum of Even-Mansour
We consider the Sum of Even-Mansour construction, called SoEM, that combines the sum of permutations of Bellare et al. [7] with the Even-Mansour cipher [32] . Let n ∈ N, and let π 1 , π 2 ∈ Perm(n). One can consider a generic construction SoEM :
See also Figure 3 . We will consider the construction for three variants: SoEM1 for the case where π 1 and π 2 are identical in Section 4.1, SoEM21 for the case where π 1 , π 2 are independent but K 1 and K 2 are identical (so the key space is n bits) in Section 4.2, and SoEM22 for the case where π 1 , π 2 are independent and K 1 , K 2 are independent in Section 4.3. Note that for SoEM21, we will have to make a slight adjustment, because by simply putting K 1 = K 2 in above equation, the addition of the keys at the end of the permutation calls will cancel out. We will detail this in Section 4.2.
One Permutation
We show that SoEM1, where π 1 = π 2 (but no a priori restriction on K 1 , K 2 is imposed) cannot achieve security beyond the birthday bound.
Proposition 2. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM1 :
n . There exists a distinguisher D making 4 · 2 n/2 construction queries such that
Encryption of SoEM based on two keys K 1 and K 2 , and with π 1 and π 2 two public random permutations.
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (SoEM1 π , π ± ) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, π ± ) with significant probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 4 · 2 n/2 construction queries and no primitive queries and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 2 n/2 , query M (j) = j n/2 0 n/2 to obtain C (j) , and query
If there are two query indicesj,j such that C (j) = C (j ) and C * (j) = C * (j ) , then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
The distinguisher's advantage satisfies
In the real world, there is exactly one (j,j ) such that
Note that the cost of step (i) in the attack can be reduced by only querying M * (j)
for j =j, but this would complicate the simple description of the distinguisher.
Two Permutations, One Key
Let n ∈ N. Let π 1 , π 2 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be two independent random permutations. We define SoEM construction based on π 1 , π 2 and using a single key K as follows:
and we show that SoEM21 cannot achieve beyond the birthday bound security.
Proposition 3. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM21 :
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (SoEM21
2 ) with significant probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 3 · 2 n/2 construction queries, 3 · 2 n/2 primitive queries to π 1 , and 3 · 2 n/2 primitive query to π 2 in total and operates as follows.
, and query M * * (j) = j n/2 0 n/2−2 10 to obtain C * * (j) ; (ii) For i = 1, . . . , 2 n/2 , query x (i) = 0 n/2 i n/2 to π 1 and π 2 to obtain y ) as the tuples that satisfy x * (i) = x (i) ⊕ 0 n−1 1 and x * * (i) = x (i) ⊕ 0 n−2 10, respectively, and similarly for the queries to π 2 ; (iii) If there are two query indicesj,ī such that
The distinguisher's advantage satisfies
In the real world, there is exactly one (j,ī) such that
In addition, also M * (j) ⊕ x * (ī) = K and M * * (j) ⊕ x * * (ī) = K, leading to
, and thus that Pr D
Two Permutations, Two Keys
We prove that SoEM22 for independent π 1 , π 2 and independent K 1 , K 2 is secure up to attack complexity 2 2n/3 . We also demonstrate an attack matching this bound. 
The proof is given in Section 6.3. primitive queries to π 1 and 4 · 2 2n/3 primitive queries to π 2 such that
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (SoEM22
2 ) with significant probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 4 · 2 2n/3 construction queries, 4 · 2 2n/3 primitive queries to π 1 , and 4 · 2 2n/3 primitive query to π 2 in total and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 2 2n/3 , query M (j) = j 2n/3 0 n/3 to obtain C (j) , query M * (j) = j 2n/3 0 n/3−1 1 to obtain C * (j) , query M * * (j) = j 2n/3 0 n/3−2 10 to obtain C * * (j) , and query M * * * (j) = j 2n/3 0 n/3−2 11 to obtain C * * * (j) ;
(ii) For i = 1, . . . , 2 2n/3 , query
, and (u * * * (i) , v * * * (i) ) as the tuples that satisfy u
, and u * * * (i) = u (i) ⊕ 0 n−2 11, respectively; (iii) For i = 1, . . . , 2 2n/3 , query x (i ) at random to obtain y (i ) , query x * (i ) = x (i ) ⊕0 n−1 1 to obtain y * (i ) , query x * * (i ) = x (ī ) ⊕0 n−2 10 to obtain y * * (i ) , and query x * * * (i ) = x (ī ) ⊕ 0 n−2 11 to obtain y * * * (i ) ; (iv) If there are three query indicesj,ī,ī such that
The distinguisher's advantage satisfies
Put q = p = 2 2n/3 . First consider the real world. Define
, and note that |I K1 | = 2 n/3 . We denote by E j,i the event that
n , and we obtain from the union bound:
For the lower bound, we denote by D j the event that a fixed j with (j, ·) ∈ I K1 satisfies M (j) ⊕x (i ) = K 2 for all i . Note that the D j 's are mutually independent for different j, and the probability of any D j is
The probability of M (j) ⊕ x (i ) = K 2 for all j, i can now be computed as
As p/2 n ≤ 1, we can use the inequality 1 − x ≤ e −x for each term of above expression, and find an upper bound
Putting all this together we get the lower bound
Note that if there exist (j,ī) ∈ I K1 andī such that M (j) ⊕ x (ī ) = K 2 , we also have that
We in addition have that (
n . Due to our definition of M * * (j) , M * * * (j) , u * * (j) , u * * * (j) , x * * (j) , and x * * * (j) ,, we thus obtain that also
Combining these three equations with (12), we can conclude that under the premise that (12) holds, the following three events
are satisfied in the real world. Therefore, for the real world, we can conclude the following:
From (10) and (11), we obtain
where p = 2 2n/3 . For the ideal world, we have
where q = p = 2 2n/3 .
Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers
Inspired by the result on SoEM22, we consider a sequential evaluation, which we call the Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers (SoKAC). It reminds of the EDMD construction of Mennink and Neves [50] instantiated with Even-Mansour, but it is not quite the same. Let n ∈ N, and let π 1 , π 2 ∈ Perm(n). We define the generic construction SoKAC : {0, 1} 2n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n as
See also Figure 4 . We will consider the construction for two variants: SoKAC1 for the case where π 1 = π 2 are identical in Section 5.1, and SoKAC21 for the case where π 1 , π 2 are independent but K 1 = K 2 are identical (so the key space is n bits) in Section 5.2. As before, for SoKAC21, we will have to make a slight adjustment, because by simply putting K 1 = K 2 in above equation, the addition of the keys at the end of the permutation calls will cancel out. We will detail this in Section 5.2. Fig. 4 : Encryption of SoKAC based on two keys K 1 and K 2 , and with π 1 and π 2 two public random permutations.
One Permutation
We show that SoKAC1, where π 1 = π 2 (but no a priori restriction on K 1 , K 2 is imposed), cannot achieve security beyond the birthday bound.
Proposition 5. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoKAC1 :
n . There exists a distinguisher D making 3 · 2 n/2 construction queries such that
Proof. The attack is identical to that of SoEM1 of Proposition 2, and henceforth omitted.
Two Permutations, One Key
Let n ∈ N. Let π 1 , π 2 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be two independent random permutations. We define SoKAC construction based on π 1 , π 2 and using a single key K as follows:
and we show that SoKAC21 is secure up to attack complexity 2 2n/3 . We also demonstrate an attack matching this bound. 
The proof is given in Section 6.4.
Proposition 6. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoKAC21 :
n . There exists a distinguisher D making 4 · 2 2n/3 construction queries, and 4 · 2 2n/3 primitive queries to π 1 and 4 · 2 2n/3 primitive queries to π 2 such that
Proof. The attack is identical to that of SoEM22 of Proposition 4, and henceforth omitted.
Security Proofs
The security proofs of SoEM22 and SoKAC21 are given in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The proofs are performed using Patarin's H-coefficient technique, which we will recap in Section 6.1. The proof of SoKAC21 relies on the sum-capture lemma, which we revisit in Section 6.2. The analysis for good transcripts resembles ideas of the first iteration in Patarin's mirror theory, but difficulties appear in the fact that the distinguisher can make direct queries to the permutations π 1 and π 2 .
Patarin's H-Coefficient Technique
In this work, we use the H-coefficient technique by Patarin [54, 56] , but we will follow the modernization of Chen and Steinberger [21] .
n be a pseudorandom function based on public random permutations π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π r . We consider a deterministic distinguisher D that has query access to either the real world oracle O = (F π1,...,πr K , π ± 1 , , . . . , π ± r ) or the ideal world oracle P = (ϕ, π ± 1 , . . . , π ± r ). The distinguisher's goal is to distinguish both worlds and we denote by
its advantage. We summarize all query-response tuples learned by D during its interaction with its oracle O or P in a transcript τ . We denote by X O (resp. X P ) the probability distribution of transcripts when interacting with O (resp. P). We call a transcript τ ∈ T attainable if P r[X P = τ ] > 0, or in other words if the transcript τ can be obtained from an interaction with P.
Lemma 1 (H-coefficient Technique).
Consider a deterministic distinguisher D. Define a partition T = T good ∪ T bad , where T good is the subset of T which contains all the "good" transcripts and T bad is the subset with all the "bad" transcripts. Let 0 ≤ ≤ 1 be such that for all τ ∈ T good :
Then, we have Adv(D) ≤ + Pr[X P ∈ T bad ].
Sum-Capture Lemma
We use the sum-capture lemma [20, 25, 51] , which is built upon the work of Babai [2] and Steinberger [63] . Such results typically state that for a random subset Z of {0, 1} n of size p, the quantity
is at most around p · |A| · |B| /2 n for any possible choice of A and B, except with negligible probability. In our setting, Z will consist of query-response tuples from a permutation, i.e., Z consists of values
)} is a permutation transcript. We will appeal to the sum-capture theorem by Chen et al. [20] .
For any two subsets A, B ⊆ {0, 1} n , we have
Proof of Theorem 1 on SoEM22
Let
Consider any distinguisher D that has access to three oracles: (SoEM22
2 ) in the ideal world. We assume D is computational unbounded and deterministic. The distinguisher makes q construction queries to O 0 ∈ {SoEM22 π1,π2 K , ϕ}, and these are summarized in a transcript of the form τ 0 = {(M (1) , C (1) ), . . . , (M (q) , C (q) )}. It also makes p primitive queries to O 1 = π ± 1 and p primitive queries to O 2 = π ± 2 , and like before, these are respectively summarized in transcripts
We assume that τ 0 , τ 1 , and τ 2 do not contain duplicate elements. After D's interaction with the oracles, but before it outputs its decision, we disclose the keys K 1 , K 2 to the distinguisher. In real world, these are the keys used in the construction. In the ideal world K 1 , K 2 are dummy keys that are drawn uniformly at random. The complete view is denoted τ = (τ 0 , τ 1 , τ 2 , K 1 , K 2 ).
Bad Events. We say that τ ∈ T bad if and only if there exists a construction query (M (j) , C (j) ) ∈ τ 0 and primitive queries (u (i) , v (i) ) ∈ τ 1 and (x (i ) , y (i ) ) ∈ τ 2 such that one of the following conditions holds:
Note that any attainable transcript τ for which τ / ∈ T bad , implies that τ is a good transcript.
We give an informal explanation of the definition of the bad event. In the real world, every construction query j induces exactly one evaluation (u (j) , v (j) ) of the underlying public permutation π 1 , and exactly one evaluation (x (j) , y (j) ) of the underlying public permutation π 2 . These two queries naturally satisfy
Clearly, u (j) and x (j) are fixed by M (j) , K 1 , and K 2 , but there is "freedom" in the value v (j) ⊕ y (j) . If it happens to be that the distinguisher queried u (j) , i.e., that (u (j) , v (j) ) ∈ τ 1 , it consequently fixes the tuple (x (j) , y (j) ) for π 2 . However, in the ideal world, there is no such dependency. This means that if the adversary had queried u (j) = M (j) ⊕ K 1 to π 1 and x (j) = M (j) ⊕ K 2 to π 2 , with high probability the third equation would not hold. An identical reasoning applies for the case where the distinguisher happened to have set any other two out of three equations.
Pr[X P ∈ T bad ]. We want to bound the probability that an ideal world transcript τ satisfies either of (19)- (21) . Therefore, the probability that τ ∈ T bad is given by
We consider the first bad event bad 1 . For any possible construction query (M (j) , C (j) ) ∈ τ 0 , any possible π 1 primitive query (u (i) , v (i) ), and any possible π 2 primitive query (x (i ) , y (i ) ), the only randomness in the first equation is K 1 and the only randomness in the second equation is K 2 . This means that the probabilities that each of the equation holds in bad 1 are independent of each other. By the fact that the keys
2n are dummy keys generated independently of τ 0 , τ 1 and τ 2 , the probability that bad 1 holds for fixed j, i, i is 1/2 2n . Summed over all q possible construction queries, p possible π 1 primitive queries, and p possible π 2 primitive queries, we have
For the second bad event bad 2 , note that we can replace K 1 in the second equation by M (j) ⊕ u (i) . Hereby, the only randomness in the first equation is K 1 and the only randomness in the second equation is K 2 . The probabilities that each of the equation holds in bad 2 are independent of each other. Again, summing over all the construction and the primitive queries, we have
The same reasoning applies for bad 3 . Summing the three probabilities, we get
Consider an attainable transcript τ ∈ T good . To compute Pr[X O = τ ] and Pr[X P = τ ], it suffices to compute the probability of oracles that could result in view τ . Denote by all O the set of all oracles in the real world, and by comp O (τ ) the fraction of them compatible with τ , we see that
Similarly we have all P and comp P (τ ) for the ideal world. We obtain
For the real world O, we have |all O | = 2 2n · (2 n !) 2 , which is equal to the number of possible keys K = (K 1 , K 2 ) times the number of possible public random permutations π 1 and π 2 . Similarly, for the ideal world P, we have
The first term corresponds to the number of randomly drawn keys, the second term is the number of possible random functions ϕ ∈ Func(n), and the last term the number of possible public random permutations π 1 and π 2 . For the computation of the number of oracles compatible with τ in the ideal world, we see that there are 2 n(2 n −q) random functions ϕ ∈ Func(n) compliant with τ 0 , (2 n − p)! public random permutations π 1 compliant with τ 1 , and (2 n − p)! public random permutations π 2 compliant with τ 2 . We find
From (23), we have
Our goal is to derive a recursive formula for λ α+1 that depends on λ α , such that a lower bound can be found for the expression λ α+1 /λ α . Note that, by definition,
Processing from (24), we obtain
We will derive a lower bound for λ α+1 /λ α . Define by B (1,2) the set of solutions that only comply with (1) and (2), with no side condition from (3) and (4). Define by B (3:i) the set of solutions that comply with (1) and (2) of above, and satisfy ¬(3 : i) for i = 1, . . . , α + |V out |. It means that any solution in this case satisfies (1) and (2), and v (α+1) ∈ {v (1) , . . . , v (α) } ∪ V out (nothing is said about y (α+1) except for property (2)). Similarly for B(4 : i). By the principle of inclusion-exclusion, we obtain Thus, we have obtained
with λ 0 = 1. Processing from (26), we obtain
Using that p, s 1 , s 2 ≤ 2 n , and combining (27) with (28), we obtain
where we use that (1 − x) y ≥ 1 − xy and q + s 1 + s 2 = q. We conclude from (28) and (29) 
Proof of Theorem 2 on SoKAC21
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1 (Section 6. For i = 1, we will use the sum-capture lemma of Section 6.2. Define
Then, by Lemma 2 with Ω 1 = µ(Z, A, B), For i = 3, Ω 3 ≥ A 3 means that 
